last. We begin, however, with a section on classical consistency properties, both for their own sake and to establish notation. ?2. Classical consistency properties. We assume we are dealing with a first-order language Lc built up from countably many constants, variables and relation symbols. By L* we mean the language which results when the list of constants of Lc is enlarged by the addition of countably many new constant symbols. We take all of A , V, a, -, V, and 3 as primitive. We follow the convention that a statement is a formula with no free variables. Since we are assuming such a large set of primitives, a uniform treatment, as in [10] becomes advisable. We may use either unsigned or signed statements at this point. We find unsigned statements slightly simpler here, but signed statements will be essential for intuitionistic logic, and will be presented then.
The collection of statements is divided into six groups: atomic statements, negations of atomic statements, conjunctives (ac), disjunctives (), universals (y) and existentials (8) . Associated with each conjunctive or a statement are two components, a1 and a2. Likewise, with each disjunctive or P statement are associated its components, P3 and f2. The following chart defines these notions. It is here that we must observe that basically two definitions of classical consistency property have been proposed in the literature. The above, which we will temporarily call weak consistency, and one (see [10] ) which substitutes for clause (5) the condition (5') 8 E S > S u {8(c)} E V for each constant c not appearing in S. Let us call sets r satisfying conditions (1)-(4) and (5') strong consistency properties. For modal and intuitionistic logics we will need both notions, so we now discuss their relationship in the classical case, which carries over to the nonclassical.
Let 6s be a strong consistency property. If we define V,, by S E V6'W if S E Vs and there are infinitely many constants of L* not appearing in S; it is easy to see that V, is a weak consistency property (and if S is a set of statements of L,, then S E es implies S E %').
Let us call a a substitution if c is a map from the set of constants of L* to itself. If X is a formula let a(X) be the result of applying a to each constant in X. Similarly a may be extended to sets of statements. Now, suppose W,, is a weak consistency property. Define Vs by S E (s if, for some substitution a, u(S) e V. Then As is a strong consistency property (and %W ' Vs). Thus these two notions are essentially equivalent.
?3. Modal logic preliminaries. Let L, be the modal language corresponding to Lc, but including D1 and K among its primitives. Likewise let L* and L* correspond, i.e., L* has countably many more constants than LM. We continue the y, ,, 8 The remainder of this section is devoted to a proof of the above theorem. First, we may define a notion of strong S4 consistency property by changing the appropriate clause in the above definition from "it is a classical consistency property" to "it is a strong classical consistency property." Then, using the methods of ?3 we may show the following:
LEMMA. Any S4 consistency property may be extended to a strong S4 consistency property.
LEMMA. Let W be a strong S4 consistency property. Let W' be the result of enlarging W be adding all unions of chains in le. Then W' is again a strong S4 consistency property.
PROOF. The seven conditions of the definition must be verified for ?'. We check conditions (3) and (5') and leave the rest to the reader.
We deal with condition (5') first. Suppose S E W%, 8 E 5, and c is a constant not appearing in S. Let S be UjSj where the Si constitute a chain in W. 8 E S, so 8 belongs to each St from some point in the chain on. By discarding an initial segment of the chain we may suppose 8 To verify condition (3), let us suppose S = UjS1 where the Si constitute a chain in K, and fi E S. As above we may assume P is in each S1. Now for each i, either Now suppose we let V consist of those finite sets S of L* which can be partitioned into two disjoint subsets, S1 and S2, so that S1D S2 has no interpolant. V is an S4 consistency property. We leave the verification of most of the clauses to the reader and discuss only the iT case.
Suppose S e -and e c S. We show S, U {ro} e W. Since S e -6l, S can be partitioned into S1 and S2 so that S1 D -2 has no interpolant. ia is in one of S1 or S2, let us say S1; the proof if 7 e S2 is similar. To make the notation reflect that V is in S1, we henceforth write S1 as S' U {ia} where ia is not in S'. Thus we have that 
?6. The logics T and K. I. By Svo we mean {vo I v E S}. Now, by a T consistency property we mean a collection V satisfying all the conditions for an S4 consistency property, except that (7) is replaced by (7') if v E Sle then S,0 U {-o} Aid The proof of the S4 Model Existence Theorem adapts to T simply by replacing S, by SO at appropriate points in the argument. Thus we have MODEL EXISTENCE THEOREM FOR T. If S is a set of statements of LM which belongs to some T consistency property, then S is T satisfiable.
The applications of this theorem are akin to those of ?5 and are left to the reader. We remark, however, that the following constitutes a complete tableau system for T: Add to the classical system of [10] the following two rules:
If v occurs on a branch, i'0 may be added to the end of the branch. If v occurs on a branch, ?T may be added to the end of the branch, but all statements on the branch which are not v statements must be deleted, and any statement of the form v must be replaced by vo.
II. By a K consistency property we mean a collection V satisfying all the conditions for a Tconsistency property except possibly (6) if v E S E V then S u {vo} E W. Again the work of ?4 easily adapts to show the following:
MODEL EXISTENCE THEOREM FOR K. If S is a set of statements of LM which belongs to some K consistency property, then S is K satisfiable.
A tableau system for K results very simply if from the above tableau system for T we delete the rule: If v occurs on a branch, vo may be added to the end of the branch. We leave the basic applications of this Model Existence Theorem to the reader. ?7. Intuitionistic logic preliminaries. Recall L, is the classical language with A, V, a, V and 3 primitive. L* has countably many more constants. We will use Kripke intuitionistic logic models, but we will only consider those whose domains consist of constants of L* and so no notion of interpretation will be mentioned. DEFINITION . By an intuitionistic model (see [9] and [3]) we mean an ordered quadruple <G, R, k, P> where (1) G is a nonempty set, (2) R is a transitive, reflexive relation on G, 
(f) rP h (Vx)A(x) for each A e G such that P R A, A 1h A(c) for each c E P(A), (g) rP h (]x)A(x) -P 1 A(c) for some c E P(P). As for modal logics, h is completely determined if its behavior is known for atomic statements, but that may be arbitrarily specified. Important observation. Condition (a) actually holds for all statements, not just atomic ones; proof is by induction on degree.
Note that rP 1 X is not the same as P M X. It thus becomes useful to introduce signed statements as in [3] . DEFINITION . By a signed statement we mean TX or FX where X is a statement of L*. We use rP h TX as synonymous with rP h X, and rP 1 FX with rP X.
If S is a set of signed statements we say S is intuitionistically satisfiable if there is some intuitionistic model, <G, R, h, P>, and some P e G with every constant of S in P(r), such that rP Z for each Z e S. (This was called realizability in [3] .) We say a set S of unsigned statements is intuitionistically satisfiable if {TX I X e S} is intuitionistically satisfiable. Finally we say X is intuitionistically valid if {FX} is not intuitionistically satisfiable.
For some of our work it is convenient to continue using uniform notation, but it must be modified to apply to signed statements. The following charts (see [10] ) do this. VI. Craig Interpolation Lemma. Let S1 and S2 be disjoint sets of signed statements of L* with no F-signed statements in S, and at most one in S2. We say <S1, S2> has an interpolant if (1) S. is intuitionistically unsatisfiable, or (2) S2 is intuitionistically unsatisfiable, or (3) there is a statement X all of whose constants and relation symbols are common to S. and S2 such that both S, U {FX} and S2 u {TX} are intuitionistically unsatisfiable. Let V consist of all finite sets S which can be partitioned into disjoint subsets S, and S2 so that <S,, S2> has no interpolant. Then W is a Gentzen consistency property. We verify a few cases. We conclude with the remark that it is possible to use S4 and intuitionistic consistency properties to show the X to X' translation is an embedding of intuitionistic logic in S4, but it is much simpler to use Kripke S4 and intuitionistic logic models directly to obtain this result.
